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ETHICS

CONSULT

An Ethics Problem
Involving Financial Abuse
What are a lawyer's ethical
obligations to a client after
termination of duties contracted? Is the legal professional responsible for
actions on the part of a
party other than the client
as a result of advice given
to a client? Exactly who is
the client when more than
one person is involved?
By Michael K.
McChrystal

Michael K. McChrystal is a profes-

sor of law at Marquette University,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a consultant on legal ethics to law firms,
corporations, and government
agencies.

The Problem
Arnold and his girlfriend,
Esther, consult Attorney Elder
(A.E.) about establishing a
guardianship for the man's
elderly father, Noah, with whom
the couple has lived for the past
two years. A.E. met with the
couple in his office for approximately one hour and learned
that Arnold is receiving unemployment compensation, after
recently leaving a job that he
held for 14 months until he was
injured in a car accident. A.E.
also learned that Esther is
employed in a retail sales job.
Later, A.E. visited for the better
part of an hour with Noah privately in his modest home,
which is clean and well maintained. Noah said that Esther
takes good care of him and the
home, and he does not object to
Arnold and Esther taking care
of his finances because they do
that already. Noah had a stroke
two years earlier and he has difficulty walking and speaking.
He also has difficulty hearing.
After visiting Noah, A.E. spoke
briefly on the phone with
Noah's primary care physician,
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who agreed that Noah's competence is questionable, based
more on the medical records
than on his recollection of
Noah. On the basis of these discussions, A.E. proceeded to
have Arnold declared guardian
for his father. Several weeks
later, Esther called A.E. to tell
him that she has left Arnold
because of his acceleratingabuse
of alcohol and drugs, that
Arnold is wasting Noah's assets,
mostly equity in the house, by
taking out home equity loans,
and that Noah is suffering from
severe neglect. What are A.E.'s
ethical obligations as a lawyer
under these circumstances?

The Analysis
Hard problems often provoke
strong, intuitive answers. Where
the law is well developed, careful
legal analysis takes us through
the issues implicit in the problem
so that we can be sure that our
response reflects the best that our
intellect and judgment can produce. The guardianship problem
above involves a set of complicated legal issues that strike at
the heart of the lawyer's role.
However strong your reaction to
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this problem might be, however
certain you are of your response,
a careful consideration of the
law is likely to lead to a bettergrounded decision about what
to do.

require as much. For example,
the District of Columbia, in a
particularly comprehensive provision in its ethics rules, spells
out the lawyer's duty in these
terms:

Who Is the Client?
The first step in analyzing
most legal ethics problems is
identifying who the clients are.
Here, that is quite unclear.
Arnold and perhaps Esther may
have a reasonable basis for
believing that they are A.E.'s
clients. They initiated the representation when they contacted
A.E., and they identified the
objective of making Arnold the
guardian for his father. Noah
also is a possible client, of
course. A.E. met privately with
him, and his interests are substantially at stake in the representation.'
Various tests are applied to
determine client status. A mutual intent to form a lawyer-client
relationship will almost always
suffice, even in the absence of a
fee. Moreover, a person becomes
a client, at least for purposes of
a malpractice action, when he or
she seeks and receives legal
advice from a lawyer, if reliance
on that advice is foreseeable or
expected. In addition, statements made in confidence to a
lawyer are protected as such, if
the statements are made as a prelude to forming a lawyer-client
relationship or in the reasonable
belief that such a relationship
then exists.
Thus, it is possible on these
facts that Arnold, Esther, and
Noah all were clients to whom
A.E. owed duties. A.E. should
have made clear to all concerned
who was a client and who was
not. Legal ethics rules often

Rule 4.3 Dealing with Unrepresented Person
In dealing on behalf of a
client with a person who is not
represented by counsel, a
lawyer shall not:
(a) give advice to the unrepresented person other than the
advice to secure counsel, if the
interests of such person are or
have a reasonable possibility of
being in conflict with the interests of the lawyer's client;
(b) state or imply to unrepresented persons whose interests are not in conflict with the
interests of the lawyer's client
that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in
the matter, the lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
Comment
[1] An unrepresented person,
particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a
lawyer will provide disinterested advice concerning the law
even when the lawyer represents a client. In dealing personally with any unrepresented
third party on behalf of the
lawyer's client, a lawyer must
take great care not to exploit
these assumptions.
[2] The rule distinguishes
between situations involving
unrepresented third parties
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whose interests may be adverse
to those of the lawyer's client
and those in which the third
party's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility of
the lawyer's compromising the
unrepresented person's interests
is so great that the rule prohibits the giving of any advice,
apart from the advice that the
unrepresented person obtain
counsel. A lawyer is free to give
advice to unrepresented persons
whose interests are not in conflict with those of the lawyer's
client, but only if it is made
clear that the lawyer is acting in
the interests of the client. Thus
the lawyer should not represent
to such persons, either expressly or implicitly, that the lawyer
is disinterested. Furthermore, if
it becomes apparent that the
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in
the matter, the lawyer must
take whatever reasonable, affirmative steps are necessary to
correct the misunderstanding.'

This rule strongly cautions
against excess informality in a
matter such as the one A.E. confronted. The interests of Arnold
and Noah potentially were in
conflict. This made it especially
important for A.E. to clarify
whom he was representing from
the beginning. It also dictated
caution in giving advice or
expressing opinions to whomever was not a client, whether
Noah or Arnold. It is a little late
to decide now whether A.E. was
representing Arnold or Noah or
both. That was a decision to be
made and announced up front. If
it wasn't, A.E. may have engaged
representation
multiple
in
involving conflicting interests.

COLUMN

COLUMN

49

Ethics Consult

49

Ethics Consult

Elder law practice, like many
forms of family law practice,
involves situations in which the
lawyer's role, to state it in a positive way, is multifaceted. (More
skeptical observers might say
such representation often is riddled with multiple representation involving irreconcilable
conflicts of interest.) The safest
course for the lawyer and the
family is to make clear to all
concerned where the lawyer's
obligations, loyalties, and priorities lie.

Does the Lawyer Have an
Obligation to Assist a Former
Client in Matters Pertaining to
the Prior Representation?
A.E. served as lawyer as requested, and presumably no further
services have been provided to
any of the parties. Has A.E. any
further obligation to these
clients?
It is clear that certain negative duties continue beyond the
conclusion of the representation.
The duty of confidentiality, to
cite the most important example, continues indefinitely.'
Former clients also are protected
by conflict-of-interest rules that
prevent their former lawyers
from representing clients who
are adverse to them in cases substantially related to the prior
representation.4 Thus, even after
the representation ends, lawyers
are bound by the negative duties
not to disclose confidential
information or use it adversely
to the former client and not to
switch sides in a case to represent a new client against the former client.
Affirmative duties to advance
a client's interests, on the other
hand, operate only within the

scope of the representation.s
Lawyers usually have no responsibility as to matters that are
unrelated to the representation or
that arise after the representation
is concluded.' Thus, even if A.E.
represented Noah in relation to
the guardianship, A.E. has no
duty to continue to monitor the
results of those services performed in the past and intervene
if circumstances warrant. At the
same time, lawyers are certainly
free to come to the aid of former
clients whom they know to be in
need. Therefore, as a general matter, a lawyer is free to contact a
former client to provide further
assistance with respect to the
same matter, but the lawyer is not
required to do so.
The same reasoning applies
to A.E.'s representation of
Arnold. Upon learning that
Arnold may be violating his
fiduciary duties to Noah, A.E. is
permitted to contact Arnold to
advise him of his responsibilities
but generally he is not required
to do so.' Again, the representation being at an end, the lawyer
is not generally required to reinstitute it. Thus, under generally
applicable principles, it is up to
A.E. whether to ignore the allegation that Arnold is financially
abusing Noah or to intervene to
warn Arnold about the risks he
would be running by his alleged
misconduct. The law of legal
ethics generally leaves that decision in the lawyer's hands.
These standards reflect a
strong policy favoring freedom
for lawyers in deciding whether
to provide (or refrain from providing) legal services in any particular matter. The lawyer-client
relationship is personal for the
lawyer, as well as for the client,
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and lawyers have an expansive
freedom to contract with what
clients they choose for whatever
scope of services they agree
upon.

Does the Lawyer Have an
Obligation to Act to Prevent
an Injury by or to a Former
Client?
As the earlier analysis
explains, a lawyer generally has
no duty to assist, or even prevent
an injury to, a former client.
Once the representation is at an
end, any future harm that befalls
a client is generally beyond the
scope of the concluded representation.
Another factor must be considered, however. An exception
to the duty of confidentiality
sometimes permits, or even
requires, a lawyer to take action
to prevent a client from seriously injuring others. Under Model
Rule 1.6(b)(1), a lawyer may
reveal confidential information
"to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to

prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result
in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm."
Some states go a step further
and require the disclosure of
confidential information in some
circumstances. Wisconsin ethics
law provides, for example:
A lawyer shall reveal [confidential] information to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to prevent the client
from committing a criminal or
fraudulent act that the lawyer
reasonably believes is likely to
result in death or substantial
bodily harm or in substantial
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injury to the financial interest
or property of another.'

In states with disclosure
requirements of this sort, an
array of interpretive issues must
be resolved before the lawyer's
duty is clear. In our example, we
would have to determine
whether Arnold is (or was) a
client of A.E. Does Esther's
statement about Arnold's misconduct relate to that representation? Does A.E. believe that
Arnold will commit a future
crime or fraud (presumably
against Noah or some third
party extending credit on the
strength of Noah's assets)? Does
A.E. believe that this crime or
fraud is likely to have one of the
serious consequences identified
in the rule? Are those beliefs reasonable under the circumstances? If the answers to all of
these questions are "yes," then
A.E. would be required to take
preventive action in the minority
of states with disclosure requirements similar to Wisconsin's.
Note, however, that most
states are similar to the Model
Rules in not requiring the disclosure of confidential information
to prevent a client from injuring
third parties.' Thus, the question
in most states is not whether
A.E. must act to prevent further
misconduct by Arnold but
whether such action is even permissible. In those states, if the
information from Esther relates
to the representation of Arnold,
it is confidential and may not be
disclosed except to prevent lifeacts.
criminal
threatening
Perhaps the financial abuse and
neglect that Arnold is inflicting
on Noah qualify under this standard. If not, the law of many

states may limit A.E., as former
counsel for Arnold, to admonishing Arnold to stop his abusive
conduct. Other measures that
A.E. takes to protect Noah could
involve violations of the ethical
duty of confidentiality.
Confidentiality rules strongly
emphasize the lawyer's duty of
loyalty to a client. Confidentiality prevails except in the
most egregious contexts, involving seriously wrongful acts that
imminently threaten dire consequences to others. With such a
powerful duty, it is clearly
important to identify who the
client is from the outset. That is
perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from A.E.'s
predicament.
In addition, it is important to
realize that the law of legal
ethics can be quite complex.
Difficult problems can involve
multiple legal ethics issues and
require complex analysis. A
lawyer's intuition about the right
thing to do may overlook or
undervalue important principles
embedded in the law.
Finally, legal ethics rules
often leave some "wiggle room"
that permits the lawyer involved
to choose from a range of possible responses. This opportunity
for discretion may be lost, however, if the identity of the client
or the scope of the representation is left in doubt.

Endnotes
1. Under the practice in most
states, it is unlikely that A.E.
would have represented Noah
in the guardianship proceeding
itself. More likely, A.E. would
file a petition as attorney for
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Arnold seeking to have him

appointed guardian.
Nevertheless, A.E. could have
entered a lawyer-client relationship with Noah, however
inadvisably, in counseling him
on the benefits and risks of a
guardianship.
2.

Compare American Bar
Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 4.3
(hereafter "Model Rule"). ("In
dealing on behalf of a client
with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer
shall not state or imply that
the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that
the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role
in the matter, the lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to
correct the misunderstanding.")

3.

See Model Rule 1.9 cmt. 12
("Information acquired by the
lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by
the lawyer to the disadvantage
of the client."). See also
Swidler & Berlin v. United
States,

_

U.S.

_ (No. 97-

1192) (June 25, 1998) (federal
attorney-client privilege continues to apply even after the
death of the client).
4.

See Model Rule 1.9.

5.

See Model Rule 1.2 cmt. 4
("The objectives or scope of
services provided by a lawyer
may be limited by agreement
with the client or by the terms
under which the lawyer's services are made available to the
client. For example, a retainer
may be for a specifically
defined purpose."); but see
Model Rule 1.16(d) ("Upon

COLUMN

termination of representation,
a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable
to protect a client's interests
6.
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It is possible that in unusual
circumstances, a lawyer who
performed work for a client,
such as drafting an estate
plan, may have a duty of reasonable care to advise the
client if changes in the law,

to the lawyer's knowledge,
seriously compromise the
value of the services performed.
7. See generally, Geoffrey Hazard,
Liability Insurance Conflicts
and Defense Lawyers: From
Triangles to Tetrahedrons,4
CoNN. L.J. 101 (1997).
8. Wisconsin Sup. Ct. Rule
20:1.6(b).
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9.

Under Model Rule 1.6, disclosure is permitted "to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary . . . to prevent the

client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes
is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily
harm. ...

"

But see Model

Rule 3.3 (candor toward the
tribunal may require disclosure
of confidential information in
some circumstances).

